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IN THE SllPREME COURT
STJ\TE OF UTJ\fl
GFtJEVJEVE A. SMIT!I, ,TF:SSE F.
'.:MJTll, BETH M. SMITH, and
Sl\LLI SMJTH GIRARD,
Involuntary Defendants,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
and Cross-Appellant.
)

Casf' No.

l 7661

vs.

C!lf'RLES I.. APPLEBY, JR.,
C'l\Tl!ERINF R. APPLEBY, DON
RJARNSON, and GRACE BJARNSON,
Defendants, Appellants,
and Cross-Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT AND CROSS-APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
The Plaintiffs filed a Verified Complaint May 8, 1978
seeking lhe forfeiture of a lease by reason of Defendants'
failure to cure various defaults set forth in a "Notice To Cure
flcf0ults" given to Defendants on or about M0rch 20, 1978, and
lncorpor0tcd by reference as Exhibit "B" in Plaintiffs' Verified
Complaint, said notice itemized specific defaults, including
insurance, health code violations, buildina code violations, and
waste, allcqing the premise~ posed risks of injury to the public.
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DISPOSITION JN THE J,O\JER COURT
At trial, evidence was provisionally received nn all
defaults hut the trial court ultimately ruled that the Verified
Complaint stated a claim for relief only with respect to
insurance.

The trial court found a hre0ch on the

j

nsurance issur

that was not timely cured, but refused to declare a forfeiture of
the lease, finding that the breach w0s not substantial enough to
justify a forfeiture and that the forfeiture was waived by
Plaintiffs' acceptance of rents

(R304).

The trial court found

that Plaintiff was entitled to recover her attorney's fees under
paragraph 12 of the lease

(R340), but only for fees incurred

relating to the insurance issue

(R305), and found that amount to

he $3,487.50 and awarded judgment accordingly

(R341).

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants attack the award of attorney's fees in five
points consuming 36 pages of their brief and assert a sixth point
that, even though they were in default, the trial court should
have awarded attorney's fee to them.
Plaintiff naturally seeks the affirmance of the award
of attorney's fees and cross-appeals bv requesting the Supreme
Court to find that Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint with exhibits
attached and incorporated therein was sufficient to raise the
issues of health code violations, building code violations, and
waste on which considerable evidence w0s presented and which
consumed most of the trial time, but which was excluded from the
trial court's consideration when it ruled that a claim for relief
was stated only with respect to insurance

(R303).
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~Jternatively,

assuming the trial court correctly ruled

that only the insurance issue was sufficiently raised, Plaintiff
requests the Supreme Court to find that the trial court abused
its discretion by denying Plaintiff's motion to amend the
complaint

(R215) made during trial.
Finally, Plaintiff seeks reversal of the trial court's

flndjnq that the lessors waived breaches of the lease by
;1cccpL11wc of rent for

i1

lmost three years between the filino of

the Verified Complaint and the date of judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent (Plaintiff) disagrees with the STATEMENT OF
FACTS set forth in Appellants' brief, particularly as follows:
1.

The lease was the joint product of both the Lessors

0nd Lessees and was not drafted by Lessors only.
7.

Plaintiff disagrees with Appellants'

characterization of the legal effect -of Plaintiffs' Verified
Complaint as Plaintiff asserts it sufficiently raises issues
other than insurance.
3.

Plaintiff disagrees with Appellants' statement

(page 10-11) that insurance coverage existed between April 27,
1978 and May 10, 1978.

The insurance agent stated in a

deposition on August 7, 1978 that there was no insurance between
those dates and repeated that testimony on the witness stand at
trial.

A full reading of his testimony should reveal that he did

not recant these statements, but merely admitted there might have
been coverage during that period.

The Verified Complaint was

filed May 8, 1978 when no insurance coverage existed, and even if
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it did, Plaintiff was not aware of it until Mr. Labrum supposedly
recanted at trial.
Defendants admit

Regardless, the trial rnurt found, and

(page 7 of Appellant's hrirf), that tho re wen•

breaches on the insurance issue.
4.

Plaintiff takes exception to Appellants' reliance

(pages ll-12 and 19) on a stipulation
dismissal with prejudice

(Rl62) and partial

(Rl64) as somehow insulating Defendants

from an assessment of attorney's fees.
(R210), supporting affidavit

On Plaintiff's motion

(R208-09), and testimony of five

witnesses at trial on February 20, 1981

(R 198-99), the

stipulation and partial dismissal was properly set aside
(R302-03).
Plaintiffs' primary concern in giving Defendants the
"Notice To Cure Defaults" and in filing the Verified Complaint
was to protect the general public from safety hazards on the
leased premises and to protect themselves from liability (R364).
The premises were found "unsafe and dangerous to human life"
(R365-367) by state and local health and building inspectors.
Additional facts relied upon by Plaintiff will he
referred to as appropriate to support the arguments made
hereinafter on this appeal.
RESPONDENT'S POINTS ON APPEAL
POINT I
THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE PLAINTIFF WAS
PROPER, BEING BASED UPON A CONTRACTUAL Al.REEM ENT AND SUPPORTED BY
CREDIBLE EVIDENCE.
The basis for awarding attorney's fees was paraqraph 12
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of th(' lease

(Rl4, 363) which provides:

"12.
ATTORNEY'S FEES:
In the event of a default in
the performance on the part of either Lessor or Lessee
the party determined to be guilty of such default or '
breach of the instant Lease shall be liable and
responsible to the non-defaulting party for reasonable
attorney's fees incurred by the non-defaulting party in
enforcing the terms of this agreement or exercising any
rights or remedies hereunder or any rights or remedies
otherwise provided by law."
Defendants were aware of this provision and were
reminded of it by the last paragraph of the "Notice To Cure
Defilults"

(R21, 364) which stated:
"Should legal action be necessary to recover possession
of the leased premises, lessors will ask the court for
an award of attorney's fees against lessees, and each
of them, for all reasonable attorney's fees incurred by
lessors in enforcing the terms of the lease agreement
or any other rights or remedies available thereunder as
provided in paragraph 12 of the lease agreement."
Paragraph 13 of the Verified Complaint (R3) alleges

that Defendants were served with this notice on or about March
21, 1978 and incorporates the entire notice as Exhibit "B" to the
complaint.

Paragraph 13 of Defendants Answer (R45) admits that

Defendant Donald Bjarnson received said notice.

Paragraph 28 of

Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint alleges Plaintiffs are entitled to
recover attorney's fees.
The trial court found

(R304) that:

"6. With respect to the insurance issue, the court
finds that the failure by lessee to maintain liability
insurance with $300,000 limits breached the
requirements of paragraph 15 of the lease, and was not
cured within 30 days of notice, although efforts were
made by lessee."
The trial court's remedy for this default was not a forfeiture of
the lease, but an attempt to place the Plaintiff (Lessor) in the
Silme <'Ondition as if the breach had not occurred, citing 49 Am.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Jur.

7d 1038

This we1s clone by ,1w0rcling PL-iintiff

(R304, 340).

her attorney's fees, but only those incurred with respect to

t~

insurance issue.
During the trial, many motions, rulings, and tri nble
issues were taken under advisement.

After ruling that PL1i ntit:

was entitled to attorney's fees incurred in enforcing the
insurance covenant the court stated (R305) that:
"While this relief (attorney's fees) was reque steel in
the complaint, no evidence w0s given at the trial.
Since the uncertainty as to triable issues may have
contributed to this omission, the court will receive
evidence within ten days by way of affidavit from both
sides on this issue, unless either party requests a
hearing, or unless plaintiff is waiving this cl~im."
Plaintiff thereafter submitted affidavits of John L.
Miles

(R377-324) and Ronald Boutwell

(R337-339) on this issue and

Defendants submitted two affidavits of Michael D. Hughes
(R327-328 and R332-334).

The trial court then ruled for

Plaintiff, awarding $3,487.50 as attorney's fees on the insurance
issue to place Plaintiff in the same condition as if the breach
had not occurred (49 Am. Jur. 2d 1038).
Defendants raise five points in a 42 page brief
objecting to the award of attorney's fees.

The lengthy brief is

notable only for its lack of relevant authority.

The first point

asserts a lack of proper testimony because the award was based
upon sworn affidavits instead of upon sworn testimony subject to
cross examination at trial.

The

Defend~nt

conveniently ignor the

fact that the trial court afforded both parties the opportunity
for a hearing upon request

(R305).

Defendants waived their

opportunity for such a hearing by electing to submit afficinvits
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on tho issue instead of requesting a hearing.

Because

tho trial court gave more weight and/or credibility to
Plaintiff's affidavits, the Defendants are attacking the
procedure they implicitly agreed to when they chose to submit
affidavits.

The trial judge presided over the five day trial,

was able to review the extensive pleadings, and being on attorney
himself, was able to make a determination of the value of
sorvices rendered by Plaintiff's attorneys.

The Supreme Court of

the United State has expressed the view that a court can proceed
upon its own knowledge of the value of an attorney's services
(Harrison v. Perea 168 U.S.

311, 42 L. Ed. 478, 18 C. St. 129).

The second point appellants raise relies upon the
stipulation executed December 8, 1980.

Page 24 of Appellants

brief states that Mr. Boutwell informed Mrs. Girard to find a new
attorney about that time when, in fact, Mrs. Girard already had
retained Mr. Miles as her attorney (Rll 7) as early as September
2, 1980.

As explained in paragraph 4 of Respondent's STATEMENT

OF FACTS, this stipulation and the resulting order were thrown
out of this case and cannot be effectively asserted against
Plaintiff.

Appellants' argument indulges in speculation, totally

irrelevant, about whether Plaintiff has actually paid these
attorney's fees, ignoring the fact that in this case the amount
of attorney's time would be the same whether there was one Lessor
or 100 Lessors.

Mr. Boutwell represented all three Lessors at

the time he performed his services relating to the insurance
issue and the work he performed would be the same regardless of
the

number of Lessors

(R337).
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The third point appellants rais0 claims the trial court
committ0c'l reversible error under Pule 6l, LT.R.C.P., in allowing
the parties to submit proof, by affidavit or hearing, on the
issue of Plaintiff's attorneys fees.

Appellants' claim that

attorney's fees were not raised or plcac'l by Plaintiff is simply
not in conformity with the facts, set forth above, showing that
attorney's fees were claimed in both the "Notice To Cure
Defaults" and in the Verifiec'l Complaint.

Appellants' argument

under Rule 61, U.P.C.P., ignors the more relevant Rule 54(c) (1),
U.R.C.P., which provides:
"Ill
Generally.
Except as to a party against whom a
judgment is entered by default, every final juc'lgment
shall grant the relief to which the party in whose
favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has
not demanded such relief in his pleadings.
It may be
given for or against one or more of several claimants;
and it may, when the justice of the case requires it,
determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each
side as between or among themselves."
This rule was considered in Palombi v. D. & C.
Builders, 22 U.

2d 297, 452 P. 2d 325 where the Utah Supreme

Court held that even though Plaintiff did not

(emphasis supplied)

ask for attorney fees in the complaint, this fact would not
preclude the trial court from awarding them to Plaintiff since
Rule 54(c) indicates that there shall be liberality of procedure
to reach the result which justice requires.

Here, attorney's

fees were requested by Plaintiffs and because of confusion over
triable issues the court allowed both parties to submit
affidavits or request a hearing on attorney's fees prior to final
judgment.

The trial judge's actions were in harmony with the

objective of Rule 54 (c) (1), U.R.C.P.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Had Plaintiff's attorneys presented evidence on
~ttornry's

fees at trial, subsequent affidavits or hearings still

,,,nulc1 havr been necessary,

under the trial court's final ruling,

to eliminate from such fees all time spent on matters not related
to the insurance issue.
Appellants' fourth point on attorney's fees asserts
that the relief afforded Plaintiff at trial was no greater than
what Defendants stipulated to prior to trial.

This assertion is

not supported by the trial court's finding (R341) that:
"The stipulation to issuance of a preliminary
injunction (with a $500.00 bond) was not the same as
stipulating that a breach of the insurance covenant had
occurred, and that a permanent injunction could issue,
without bond. This issue was in fact litigated, and
gave rise to the entitlement to attorneys fees."
Appellants' reliance on the stipulation (R 162) which
was thrown out (R 302) is unavailing because that was not made
with Plaintiff's knowledge or consent, nor did it stipulate to a
br<?ach of the insurance covenant or to a permanent injunction and
an award of $3,487.50 to restore Plaintiff to the same condition
as if the breach had not occurred.
The appellants' fifth argument on attorney's fees
asserts that the trial court improperly tried the issue by
affidavit.

Appellants rely on Freed Finance Co. v. Stoker Motor

Co. 537 P.2d 1039,

(Utah 1975).

In that case the Utah Supreme

Court held that the trial court's summary judgment must be set
aside, and in reference to attorney's fees said that:
"Even if there were no disputed issue of material fact,
the summary judgment could not award an attorney's fee
without a stipulation as to the amount, an unrebutted
affidavit, or evidence given as to the value thereof
(emphasis supplied). Without any basis therefore, the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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trial court awarded plaintiff an attorney's fee ln the
sum of $30,000.00."
In this case, the trial court was not considcrjng
summary judgment where a material issue of fact would preclude
the summary judgment.

A further distinction is that hoth sides

did, in fact, submit evidence by way of affidavits on the value
of attorney's fees and waived the opportunity to request a
hearing on this issue.
RESPONDENT'S POINTS ON CROSS-APPEAL
POINT I
PLAINTIFFS' VERIFIED COMPLAINT WITH EXHIBITS ATTACHED
AND INCORPORATED THEREIN SUFFICIENTLY RAISED THE ISSUES OF HEALTH
CODE VIOLATIONS, BUILDING CODE VIOLATIONS, AND WASTE SO THAT
EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL ON THESE ISSUES SHOULD HAVE BEEN
CONSIDERED BY THE COURT, DEFENDANTS NOT BEING UNFAIRLY SURPRISED
OR PREJUDICED.
Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint alleges, in pertinent
portions, the following:
"13. On or about the 21st day of March, 1978,
Defendants were served a NOTICF. TO CURE DEFAULTS. A
true copy of said notice is attached to this complaint
as Exhibit "B" and incorporated by reference as if
fully set forth." (R3).
"24. Lessee defendants are in default under the lease
and have failed to cure said default within 30 days
after receiving notice of said default.
25. Because of lessee defendants continuinq default
plaintiffs are entitled to re-enter the premises and
take possession." (R4)
"30. The lease agreement provides that the leased
premises shall be operated in the main as a
recreational and therapeutic spa.
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31. Such operation allows many customers to come onto
the premises for the purpose of bathing in a pool area
and a grotto area.
32. In the pool area, there are no life guards or
anyone else to prevent accidents or prevent small
children from swimming unattencled in the large swimming
pool.
33. The grotto area is located under steep cliffs of
rocks and boulders. Occasionally a rock or boulder
will fall onto the grotto area where bathers are
bathing." (RS).
"3S. Operation of the leased premises poses risks of
injury to body and property.
It is because of such
risks that plaintiffs have continually tried to make
lessee secure liability insurance on the premises as
provided for in the lease agreement." (RS).
"WHEREFORE; plaintiffs pray for judgment against
defendants as follows:
1. Declaring defendants have breached the terms of
the lease agreement.
2. Quieting plaintiff's title to the real property
described in the lease agreement.
3. Placing plaintiffs in possession of the leased
property." (R7)
The "Notice To Cure Defaults", in pertinent portions,
lists, in addition to insurance, the following defaults

(R

l 9-20) :

"3. Lessees must not continue to operate the leased
premises in violation of Utah State Division of Health,
Code of Camp, Trailer Court, Hotel, Motel and Resort
Sanitation Regulations, adopted by the Utah State Board
of Health on February 21, 1968, under authority of
26-lS-4, U.C.A., 19S3, as amended.
4. Lessees must eliminate waste on the leased premises
and restore said leased premises to that condition
which the leased premise would now be in if said leased
premises had been cared for in a reasonable and prudent
manner as provided in paragraph 10 of said lease
aareement.
Particular areas where lack of care or
w~ste has allowed the leased premises to become
dilapidated are as follows:
(a). The grotto area on the leased premises has become,
and continues to be, unclean, unkept and dangerous to
users.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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j

(b). The swimming pool areil is fal lin<J into disrepair
and is a health h'1zard.
Thf' pool area is in violation
of the Utah State Division of Health, Regulations
Relating to Operation and Maintenance of Public
Swimming and Wading Pools.
(c). The cabin motel units are falling in disrep2ir and
are not in clean, sanitary and operable condition.
There is no adequate or approved screening to control
insects and the windows, shades, curtains, furniture
and fixtures arc not clean and in good repair.
The
units are in violation of State law as referred to in
paragraph 3 above, as well as county health laws.
(d). The roads on the leased premises are in disrepair
with chuck holes and inadequate graveling.
(e). Electrical and plumbing on the leased premises is
unsafe and does not comply with anv standard of
safety. "
Paragraph 13 of Defendants' answer

(R45) admits that

they received the "Notice To Cure Defaults" putting them on
notice of the defaults claimed.

That Defendants were well aware

of the breaches alleged in the "Notice To Cure Defaults" is

sho~

by Interrogatories filed by their attorney on August 21, 1978,
specifically numbers 31, 32
and 46, 47, 48

(R61).

November 13, 1980

(R58); 36

(R59); 43, 44, 45

(R60);

These Interrogatories were answered on

(Rl28-157) and supplemental answers on

questions 28 and 29 were filed January 28, 1981

(R 172-183).

Defendants objected strenuously to the inspection
reports of the building inspectors and health inspectors,
claiming unfair surprise, but these inspectors had communicated
the problems to Defendants at or shortly after the time of
inspection.

These reports found the premises "to be unsafe and

dangerous to human life"

(R

366, 365, 367).
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Considerations of public policy dictate that when a
public facility is found to be dangerous to human life, the court
should not, on technical grounds, rule that the default was not
rajsed in the pleadings and thereby allow the dangerous condition
to continue.
Defendants place unwarranted reliance on their claim
that because Plaintiff did not provide them with a detailed list
of deficiencies on the building and health code violations,
Plaintiff cannot assert these violations at trial.

Defendants

seem to forget that it was they who agreed, in paragraph 11 of
the lease, to abide by the laws, ordinances, or regulations of
Washington County and the State of Utah

(R 14) and that it was

their duty as Lessees and operators to know the applicable laws,
ordinances and regulations and abide by them.

When the "Notice

To Cure Defaults" was given to them, it became incumbent upon
them to call in the inspectors, learn the deficiencies, and cure
the same.

Instead, they attempted to shift this responsibility

onto Plaintiff by filing a set of 79 Interrogatories and then
objected at trial when the evidence was offered.

Had Defendants

spent a few minutes making telephone calls to the building and
health inspectors instead of hours drafting interrogatories, they
would have quickly learned what defects existed.

It should be

remembered that these public inspectors were equally available to
Defendants as they were to Plaintiffs.
The "Notice To Cure Defaults" specifically referred to
the Utah State Division of Health, Code of Camp, Trailer Court,
Hotel, Motel and Resort Sanitation Regulations adopted by the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Utah State Board of Health on February 7l, 1968 pursuant

t ,,

Section 26-15-4 of the Utah Code.
without charge from the health department in St. George, Utah
was admitted at trial as Plaintiff's Exhibit 11
Plaintiffs' could not have been

~ore

Defendants were required to meet.

a~

(R 368).

specific as to the

standa~

They should not be heard in

claiming unfair surprise or prejudice.
Particularly is this true when Plaintiffs' proposed
Pre-trial Order (R 75-82) and Defendants own proposed pre-trial
order (R 83-92) included the issues of building code violations,
health code violations, and waste

(R 87-88).

Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint, with attached Exhibits
incorporated therein, is sufficient under the liberalized rules
of pleading.

Rule 8(a), URCP, only requires a pleading to set

forth a short and plain statement of the claim and a demand for
the relief Plaintiff seeks.

Rule lO(c), URCP, provides that:

"Statements in a pleading may be adopted by reference
in a different part of the same pleading or in another
pleading, or in any motion.
An exhibit to a pleading
is a part thereof for all purposes."
Plaintiff's complaint sets forth her claims in the
numbered paragraphs thereof and in the exhibits adopted by
reference.
In Blackham v. Snelgrove 3 Utah 2d 157, 280 P.

7d 453

the Supreme Court said that the complaint need only give fair
notice of the nature and grounds of claim and an indication of
the type of litigation.

Defendants certainly had fair notice

since the March 20, 1978 "Notice To Cure Defaults" specifically
sets forth the defaults Plaintiff claimed then and is claiming
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now.

When that notice was adopted in the complaint the

ncfendants again had fair notice that these defaults were
seriously being pursued.

That Defendants knew this fact is

evidenced by the interrogatories filed as early as August, 1978.
'l'hc same remedy, that is, forfeiture of the lease, was being
sought on account of all defaults, so no new relief was requested
on account of building and health code violations that was not
being sought because of failure to maintain insurance.
Rule 8 (f), URCP, provides that "All pleadings shall be
so construed as to do substantial justice."

This is consistent

with the fundamental purpose of liberalized pleadings to allow
parties to present their legitimate contentions on the merits.
Defendant's failure to object to Exhibit "B" as a part
of the complaint by a motion for a more definite statement or a
motion to strike has been waived under Rule 12 (h), URCP and
Defendant cannot now complain that the issues raised by Exhibit
"B" are not in the pleadings.

Rule l(a), URCP, states:

"They (the Rules of Civil Procedure) shall be liberally
construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action."
In Bunting Tractor Co. vs. Emmett D. Ford Contractors 2
Utah 2d 275, 272 P.2d 191 the court held that in liberally
construing and applying the Rules of Civil Procedure, the courts
should seek to afford litigants every reasonable opportunity to
be heard on the merits of their cases.

In liberally construing

the rules, courts look to the substance and merits of a
controversy rather than to technicalities of terms and
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superficialities of form

(Crist v. Maplc,ton City 28 Utcih 2d 7,

497 P. 2d 633).
In Prince v. Peterson 538 P.2d 1325
pleadings were attacked as being deficient.

(Utah 1975) the
The Utah Supreme

Court held otherwise, stating, on page 1328, that:
"In regard to the claimed def ic ienc ie s in the pleading
and proof of damages, these observations are to be
made: the purpose of pleadings is to advise the
opponent and give him an opportunity to meet the issues
and the contentions.
If that purpose is served, the
requirements of the law are met."
Rule lO(c), URCP, specifically provides for

adoption~

reference and states that "An exhibit to a pleading is a part
thereof for all purposes."
In 61A Am. Jur.

2d 60 the general rule is stated as

follows:
"Many cases take the position that for the purpose of
determining the sufficiency of the statement of the
cause of action, an exhibit on which the cause of
action is founded is to be deemed a part of the
pleading when made so by apt words thereof, and that
the pleading and exhibit forming a part thereof are to
be construed together."
Defendants rely on Chesney v. Chesney 33 Utah 503, 94
P.989, an old Utah case following the minority rule and adhering
to the technicalities of strict pleading.

That case is not in

harmony with the new more liberal rules of civil procedure and
should not be followed by this court, particularly when Rule
lO(c), URCP, now specifically follows the general rule.
regard, 61A Am. Jur.

In this

2d 61 states:

"It seems generally agreed, evcn in the absence of an}'
controlling statute or rule of practice, that it is
permissiblf' to refer to, and thereby make a part of one
count or defense, the whole or a part of the
allegations of another count or defense in the same
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pleading.
In many jurisdictions the statutes and rules
of practice expressly authorize the adoption or the
incorporation by reference of statements in different
parts of the same pleading or of other pleadings or
motions, and of matters incorporated in copies or
exhibits attached to the pleadings."
Accordingly, the trial court erred when it ruled
Pl?intiffs' Verified Complaint did not sufficiently raise the
issues regarding building code violations, health code violations
and waste when those issues were specifically adopted by
reference to the "Notice To Cure Defaults" attached as an Exhibit
to the Verified Complaint and added no new claim for relief.
Defendants were not unfairly surprised or prejudiced where the
record shows the notice and complaint were received by Defendants
nearly three years prior to trial and those issues were addressed
in interrogatories and included in Defendants own proposed
pre-trial order

(R 83) submitted to the trial court more than a

year prior to trial (R 74).

The trial court should be instructed

to consider the evidence presented in the five day trial on these
issues and make appropriate rulings on them.
consumed most of the trial time

These issues

(R 303) and it would be expensive

and contrary to the purpose as expressed in Rule 1, URCP, to
require a new trial on these issues.
POINT II
ASSUMING, FOR SAKE OF ARGUMENT, THAT POINT I ABOVE ON
CROSS-APPEAL IS NOT WELL TAKEN, THE TRIAL COURT NEVERTHELESS
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND MADE
DURING TRIAL.
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When it became apparent to Plaintjff during trial that
Defendants' objections to evidence on waste and building and
health code violations were being takPn seriously by the trial
court, Plaintiff filed a "Motion To Amend Complaint"
together with supporting points and authorities

(R 71 S)

(R 216-218).

As

shown in POINT I above, the rules provide for liberal
construction of pleadings and amendments in order to present
controversies on their merits and, in this case, Defendants wouN
not be unfairly surprised or prejudiced by allowing such an
amendment because they not only knew of Plaintiff's claims and
included them in their own pre-trial order, but also because
continuances of the trial gave Defendants almost a full month (R
194 and R 266)

to prepare to meet these issues even if Defendants

had been surprised at trial by presentation of these issues.
However, Defendants were not surprised nor prejudiced
by these issues, as these claims were included in Defendants'
pre-trial order
769

(R 87-88).

(Arizona, 1979)

In this regard, Eng v.

is instructive.

o~

Stein 599 P.2d

There the court, on page

800, stated:
"The amendment of pleadings to conform to the evidenCT
is to permit the case to be tried ultimately on the
merits in one trial with all parties having a
resolution of their disputes without a multiplicity of
suits.
Such trial amendments should be permitted when
neither party is surprised nor prejudiced by the
allowance of the amendment.
In the case at issue the amount of the additional
claims had been raised in pre-trial discovery, and t~
defendant cannot be said to be surprised nor prejudic~
by the allowance of the amendment to reflect the
additional amount."
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Rule B(f), URCP, provides that "All pleadings shall be
construed as to do substantial justice."
Rule 15(b), URCP, provides, in part, that:
"If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground
that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings,
the court may allow the pleadings to be amended when
the presentation of the merits of the action will be
subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to
satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence
would prejudice him in maintaining his action or
defense upon the merits."
The Utah Supreme Court, in Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d
205, 381 P.

2d 86 stated that the fundamental purpose of

liberalizing the rules of pleading and procedure was to allow the
parties to present all their legitimate contentions and that all
the parties are entitled to is notice of the issues raised and an
opportunity to meet them.
In Wells v. Wells 2 Utah 2d 241, 272 P.2d 167, Rule
15(b), URCP, was examined in detail.

The Utah Supreme Court

quoted Jackson v. Cope 1 Utah 2d 330, 266 P.2d 500 with approval
on page 170 as follows:

'"* * *amendments should be liberally allowed in the

interest of justice whenever it will aid in settling an
entire controversy.
The limitations thereon should be
whether the matters involved are such as can be
conveniently and effectively handled in one trial
without injury to substantive rights.'"
The Wells case discussed the confusion caused by
different meanings and construction given the term "cause of
action" and then stated, on page 170, that the:
"test is not whether under technical rules of pleading
a new cause of action is introduced, but rather the
test is whether a "'wholly different cause of action'"
or "legal obligation" is introduced, that is, an
amendment will be allowed if a change is not made in
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the liability sought to be enforced against the
defendant."
The same liability has been sought by Plaintiff on the
waste and building and health code violations as on the insurance
violation, namely, a forfeiture of the lease.

No new legal

obligation is introduced by a consideration of these additional
The subject matter throughout the course of this case

defaults.

has been whether or not Defendants have co!11JTlitted breaches of the
lease justifying forfeiture.

As this court held in Graham v.

Street 166 P.2d 524 (Utah 1946), pages 527 and 528:
"The new allegations do not introduce matters which
interject an entirely new, distinct and unrelated legal
obligation but enlarge on the facts so as to present a
series of transactions all germane and forming a
connected whole reflecting the manner in which the
plaintiff suffered injury, the bounds of an amendment
are determined by what can fbe) conveniently and
efficiently [handled) as a single unit * * * without
injury to substantive rights."
"It is not required that a series of transactions so
closely related in time and fact as to produce a
substantial cause and effect transition be grouped and
compartmentalized so as to fall into designated types
of legal actions.
The law serves life."
The law should also protect life when the evidenced
presented showed that this public facility was "dangerous to
human life"

(R 365, 366).

In 61A Am. Jur. 2d 297-98 it states:
"An application for leave to amend is ordinarily
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court,
and as a rule, this discretion will not be disturbed oo
appeal except in case of an evident abuse thereof, or
unless the appellant shows affirmatively that he was
prejudiced by the ruling.
The discretion with which
the court is vested in respect to the allowance or
refusal of amendments is a sound discretion to be
exercised in the furtherance of justice, and may not bE
exercised to defeat justice.
The court may not
unreasonably refuse leave to amend."
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I

''It is a general rule that amendments to pleadings are
favored and should be liberally allowed in furtherance
of justice, in order that every case may so far as
possible be determined on its real facts, and in order
to speed the trial of causes, or prevent circuity of
action and unnecessary expense."
These general rules are followed in Utah, as shown by
Gillman v. Hansen 26 Utah 2d 165, 486 P.2d 1045 where this court
stated, on page 1046:
"Ordinarily the allowance of an amendment by leave of
court is a matter which lies within the sound
discretion of the trial court. This discretion,
however, is to be exercised in the furtherance of
justice and must not be exercised so as to defeat
justice. The rule in this state has always been to
allow amendments freely where justice requires, and
especially is this true before trial."
This court then recited Rule l(a), URCP, and held that
the trial court abused its discretion in refusing the amendment.
In First Security Bank of Utah v. Colonial Ford 597 P.2d 859
(Utah 1979) the court quoted Rule 15(b) in its entirety and noted
that it was in harmony with Rule 54(c) (1), quoting that rule, and
then stated, on page 861 that:
"Whatever else may he said about whether it is
mandatory or discretionary under the rules just quoted
to grant such a motion to amend, it could not be made
plainer that the underlying purpose of the rules is
that judg~ent should be granted in accordance with the
law and the evidence as the ends of justice require;
and that this is true whether the pleadings are
actually amended or not."
Defendants, since the "Notice To Cure Defaults" dated
March 20, 1978, have known of Plaintiff's claims.

The health

code violations were specifically pleaded by reference to state
statute and the date the specific regulations were adopted by the
Under Rule 9 (i), URCP, this is a

Utah State Division of Health.
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sufficient allegation.
access to such regulations ancl an opportunity to rcquPst
inspection to determinP what 1vas neccssar:: tri rure

t hF::

;in

<icf0ult.

In paragraph 11 of the lease agreement, Defendants a0recd tc.
operate the premises in complianre with the laws, nrdinances anrl
regulations of Washington County and the State of Utah.
From the moment the lease was cxecutecl the Defendants
are deemed to know the requirements of such laws, ordinances anct
regulations.

In fact, the existing laws, ordinances, and

regulations become a part of the contract.

(17 Am. Jur 2d

Contracts Section 374).
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING Tlll\T PLAINTIFFS

fll\D

1-JAIVED THE FORFEITURE BY ACCEPTANCE OF REUT.
The "Notice To Cure Defaults" given to Defendants on

ITT

about March 20, 1978 stated at the hottom of page two (R 20, 364)
that:
"No waiver of this notice or the required thirty (30)
days to cure the above-mentioned defaults will be
granted unless in writing and signed by all parties
concerned."
In the Verified Complaint Plaintiffs alleged Defendants had
breached the lease and Plaintiffs were therefore entitled to
possession

(paragraph 25 on R 4).

Plaintiffs also alleged that

Defendants were in possession of the premises
R2), which fact was admitted by Defendants

(paragraph 7 on

(raraqraph 7 on R44).

That situation continued from May 8, 1978 when the Complaint was
filed until the trial which commenced on January 29, 1981, almost
three years later.

Monthly rent under the lease was $700.00 per
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Month

(paragraph 2(B) of R 11). That amounts to $22,400.00 over

the 32 months between the filing of the complaint and the trial.

Apparently the trial court felt Plaintiffs, despite the express
statement that no waiver would be granted unless in writing and
signed by all the parties, should have refused the $22,400.00
rent even though Defendants continued in possession and collected
all the income generated by the business during this period.
such a result is unconscionable as it rewards Defendants for
being in default and penalizes Plaintiffs for resorting to the
courts to preserve their legal rights under the lease.
The general rule is stated in 49 Am. Jur. 2d 1031-32 as
follows:
"It is a general rule that a lessor is estopped from
asserting a forfeiture for a breach of covenant or
condition in a lease, or that he waives his right to
such a forfeiture, where after and with full knowledge
or notice of such breach he accepts rent from his
tenant, unless there are circumstances arising from
such acceptance of rent by him so as to negative the
presumption of his af f irmance of the continuance of the
lease."
Here there were circumstances negating the presumption
of the general rule because the "Notice To Cure Defaults"
expressly stated there would be no waiver and it would be
unconscionable in this case to deny Plaintiffs the rents while
attempting to assert their contractual rights, thereby rewarding
Defendants for their alleged breaches.
In Kenny v. Seu Si Lun 101 Minn. 253, 112 NW 220 the
court held that if payment to the landlord is not made as rent
accruing under the lease, but as compensation for the lessee's
wrongful withholding of the possession or on a quantum meruit
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basis, it will not operate as a waiver.

It cannot be doubted

that the parties, through their attornevs, treated the rent
either as compensation for withholding possession or as
compensation on a quantum meruit basis, otherwise, they would noL
have pursued the litigation for three years until trial.
In Karbelnig v. Brothwell 244 Cal. App. 2d 333, 53 Cal,
Rptr. 335 the court said that where the lessor qives notice such
as given here, that the acceptance of rent

after breach of a

covenant will not be construed as a consent to the breach or a
waiver of the right to assert a forfeiture.
The authorities are split on whether the acceptance of
rent due after a forfeiture has been declared constitutes a
waiver.

In 49 Am. Jur. 2d 1035 it states:
"The better view is said to be that the acceptance of
rent due after a forfeiture has been declared does not
waive the forfeiture as a matter of law."
The theory behind this general rule is that a

declaration of forfeiture shows an irrevocable intention to avoid
the lease.

This better view is, in this case, buttressed by the

express declaration of the Plaintiffs that no waiver would be
granted.
Waiver has been defined, in Blacks Law Dictionary 96
(5th Ed. 1979) as "The intentional or voluntary relinquishment of
a known right."

The question of waiver then becomes

primarily~

issue of intent, and when that intent is expressly stated in the
"Notice To Cure Defaults" that no waiver would be granted unless
in writing signed by all parties, that expression of intent must
control.
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CONCLUSION
The award of Plaintiffs' attorney's fees should be
sustained and the cause remanded with directions to the trial
court to consider the evidence presented at trial on issues of
waste, building code violations and heal.th code violations and
rule accordingly inasmuch as Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint
either sufficiently raised these issues under the liberalized
Utah rules and cases or the Plaintiff's motion to amend should
have been granted.

Further, that acceptance of rent was not a

waiver of the forfeiture where Plaintiffs expressly stated in the
"Notice To Cure Defaults" that no waivers would be granted.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8th day of February, 1982.
ATKIN, WRIGHT & MILES

£oillf L. MILES

Attorney for Plaintiff,
Respondent And Cross-Appellant
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